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Abstract The nature of the interaction between manufacturers and retailers has
received a great deal of empirical attention in the last 15 years. One major line of
empirical research examines the balance of power between them and ranges from
reduced form models quantifying aggregate profit and other related trends for
manufacturers and retailers to structural models that test alternative forms of
manufacturer-retailer pricing interaction. A second line of research addresses the
sources of leverage for each party, e.g., trade promotions and their pass-through,
customer information from loyalty programs, manufacturer advertising, product
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The nature of the interaction between manufacturers and retailers has received a
great deal of attention in the last 15 years. One major line of empirical research
focuses on the balance of power between them. Research in this area ranges from
reduced form models quantifying aggregate profit and other related trends for
manufacturers and retailers to structural models that test alternative forms of
manufacturer-retailer pricing interaction or determine how total channel profit is split
between the two parties. Another major line of research addresses the sources of
leverage for each party, e.g., trade promotions and their pass-through, customer
information from loyalty programs, manufacturer advertising, product assortment in
general, and private label assortment in particular. The purpose of this article is to (a)
synthesize what has been learnt about the nature of the interaction between
manufacturers and retailers and the effectiveness of each party’s sources of leverage,
and (b) highlight gaps in our knowledge that future research should attempt to fill.
The framework that guides our discussion is provided in Fig. 1. The three
concentric ovals in the figure represent three levels of knowledge we have
accumulated about manufacturer-retailer interactions. The innermost oval represents
what we know most about—the nature of pricing interaction, the leverage of private
labels, and trade promotions by manufacturers and their pass-through by wholesalers
and retailers. The middle oval represents areas where empirical insights are still
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Fig. 1 Guiding framework
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retailer’s product assortment decisions, and how the customer data that are
increasingly captured through retailers’ loyalty programs are being used to shift
the power balance and/or create win-win opportunities for manufacturers and
retailers. The outermost oval represents areas in which most of the work is
theoretical and where much more empirical work is needed. The arrows emanating
from the center of the figure represent changes in the environment and new
opportunities for research that we believe will be instrumental in improving our
understanding of the issues in the outer ovals. In the remainder of this article, we
synthesize what we have learned in each area and provide an agenda for future
research guided by the changes and opportunities noted in the figure.
2 The pricing interaction between manufacturers and retailers
In recent years, researchers have begun to explicitly capture the vertical strategic
interaction between manufacturers and retailers using structural econometric models.
Some researchers focus on inferring the nature of the manufacturer-retailer interaction,
while othersassumethe natureofthe interactionanduse theestimatedmodel toperform
policy analyses.
Sudhir (2001) and Che et al. (2007) use non-nested model tests to select whether
manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) or vertical Nash relationships (VN) better describe
the manufacturer-retailer relationship. They find support for the MS relationship and
also find that retailers maximize category profits not just brand profits. Kadiyali et
al. (2000) analyze pricing in the channel using a conjectural variations (CV)
approach, whereby a structure is not imposed on the interaction between
manufacturers and retailers, but inferred from the estimated CV parameter. The
CV model fits better than either VN or MS. Using a similar approach, Villas-Boas
and Zhao (2005) find small but statistically significant deviations from MS. A
flexible alternative approach to determine the nature of vertical interaction has been
proposed by Draganska et al. (2010), who build on the theoretical work of Iyer and
Villas-Boas (2003) and estimate a Nash bargaining model of manufacturer-retailer
interactions. The model allows for a behavioral interpretation of the deviations from
MS or VN by relating these deviations to bargaining power.
How does the manufacturer-retailer interaction affect retail and wholesale prices?
Whatfractionoftheoverallchannelmargingoestothemanufacturerversustheretailer?
How is this affected by their relative bargaining power? Kadiyali et al. (2000)f i n dt h a t
retailers’ share of channel profits are greater than those of manufacturers, varying from
a low of 57% to a high of 72% for the categories they study. In contrast, Villas-Boas
and Zhao (2005) report retail margin shares of 50% for the smaller brands and 40%
for the dominant brand, suggesting evidence of manufacturer power.
Draganska et al. (2010) Nash bargaining model distinguishes between bargaining
power and bargaining position—the net gain in profit relative to profit when
bargaining fails. For single-product markets, bargaining power of an agent is shown
to be the fraction of the channel profits that accrues to the agent—thus giving a
structural interpretation to the channel profit share measure used in earlier research.
Draganska et al. find that bargaining power largely favors manufacturers but depends
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firms, store brand share, positioning, and the retailer’sa s s o r t m e n t .
These divergent findings need to be reconciled. Evidence of manufacturer power
tendstobefoundinsettingswherewholesalepriceisunobserved(Villas-BoasandZhao
2005; Draganska et al. 2010) and retailers are allowed to compete with each other
(Draganska et al. 2010) while Kadiyali et al. (2000) find evidence of retailer power in
a setting where wholesale price is observed and retailers are assumed to be local
monopolists. The former is in line with Farris and Ailawadi (1992) and Ailawadi et al.
(1995), who do not find support for increasing retailer profitability in aggregate
industry trends. It would be helpful for future research to investigate bargaining power
in a setting where wholesale price is observed for multiple competing retailers in
different categories. Natural or field experiments could be used to calibrate model
assumptions, as counterfactual bargaining outcomes are seldom observed.
Overall, even though there are some departures from the MS model, it is the
workhorse for modeling manufacturer-retailer interactions. Many papers involving
manufacturer-retailer interactions now assume MS to address a variety of issues such
as optimal targeting (Besanko et al. 2003; Pancras and Sudhir 2007), slotting
allowances (Israelevich 2004), value of distribution channel (Chu et al. 2007;
channel mergers (Villas-Boas 2007), brand equity measurement (Goldfarb et al.
2009), and dynamic demand for durable tied goods (Hartmann and Nair 2007).
It is important, however, to note that much of this work has been done on a small
number of grocery and general household product categories in the US grocery format.
Many environmental trends are changing: retail formats have proliferated, consumer
purchases can be tracked across stores and store formats, data have become available in
new categories, new markets, and new formats. Future research should exploit the
opportunities opened up by these new data to test existing findings and learn more about
howmanufacturersandretailersinteracttodetermineformatchoice,prices,andcontracts.
Changes in the legal system have also occurred that directly influence
manufacturer-retailer interaction but have gone relatively unnoticed by academic
researchers. Until 1997, resale price maintenance was per se illegal in the US.
However, in 1997, the US Supreme Court ruled that maximum resale price
maintenance was no longer per se illegal, and in 2007, it ruled that minimum resale
price maintenance was no longer per se illegal. This ruling has important
ramifications for how manufacturers set and influence retail prices and for the
general level of pricing and retailer service across different industries, retail formats,
and brands.
Finally, the interaction between manufacturers and retailers depends upon the
informationflow,informationasymmetry,andinformationsignalingbetweenthem.The
advent of new channels like DTC selling for manufacturers and new data collection
mechanismslikeradio-frequency identification (RFID) technology (Larson et al. 2005;
Hui et al. 2009a, b) have the potential to change the power structure in the channel by
bringing the manufacturer “closer” to the consumer. The availability of longer time
series of richer panel data should allow researchers to study the impact of these new
channels and new data and also provide deeper insights into whether, how, and why
bargaining power of retailers is changing over time. These data will also be key to
bringing in phenomena such as variety-seeking and subsequent-assortment optimiza-
tion (e.g., Rooderkerk et al. 2008), learning (e.g., Camerer and Ho 1999), state
Market Lettdependence, and forward-looking behavior (e.g., Erdem and Keane 1996; Che et al.
2007) into models of manufacturer-retailer interactions.
3 The leverage of private label
In recent years, empirical researchers have presented convincing evidence about the
role that private labels play in the interaction between manufacturers and retailers
and the leverage they provide to the latter. One area of enquiry relates to retail
margins on private labels versus national brands. That retail percentage margins are
higher on private labels than on national brands can be stated as an empirical
generalization (Hoch and Banerji 1993; Ailawadi and Harlam 2004; Pauwels and
Srinivasan 2004). However, private labels are sold at retail prices that are 20-30%
lower than national brands, so private labels do not always provide a dollar margin
advantage to retailers (Ailawadi and Harlam 2004).
Another area relates to whether private label is an effective bargaining tool for
retailers. Ailawadi and Harlam (2004) show, in a cross-category analysis, that a
retailer’s national brand margin increases with its private label share in a category, after
controlling for the fact that retailers may push private label more in profitable
categories. Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004) find that when a retailer introduces a private
label, its unit margin on national brands increases. They also find that the entry hurts
the performance of second tier national brands but may be beneficial for premium-
priced national brands. Meza and Sudhir (2008) confirm that increased competition
from a private label lowers national brand wholesale prices. They also find that national
brands that are imitated by a private label, and thus face more intense competition, have
prices lower than predicted by the MS model, while the wholesale prices of non-
imitated national brand prices are consistent with the MS model, suggesting that the
retailer gains bargaining power from the introduction of private labels.
A third area relates to whether private labels engender store loyalty among
consumers. On the one hand, correlational and survey-based studies suggest a
positive association between private label use and consumer loyalty to the retailer
(Ailawadi et al. 2001; Corstjens and Lal 2000). Sudhir and Talukdar (2004) provide
further, albeit indirect, support for this association. On the other hand, Hansen and
Singh (2008) find that heavy store brand users are most likely to defect when a low-
price retailer like Wal-Mart enters the market. Ailawadi et al. (2008) reconcile these
findings, showing that, after controlling for endogeneity, there is an inverted U effect
of private label share on share of wallet. Share of wallet initially increases with their
private label purchases from a given retailer, but, the effect turns negative for very
high private label share.
This work implies that private label is a strong weapon in a retailer’s arsenal when
it comes to negotiating with manufacturers. But, the margin advantage of private
label is not a given. Retailers must keep their private label costs low but they must
also improve quality and differentiate their offerings if they want to reduce the retail
price gap with national brands. This balancing act between cost containment and
quality improvement is even more important now as many retailers try to develop a
multi-tier private label strategy with value and premium private label products
(Geyskens et al. 2008). They have a similar tight rope to walk when it comes to
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products, but, pushing it too far may hurt consumer loyalty. It is also in
manufacturers’ interest to understand the benefits and limitations of private label
brands so that they can negotiate effectively with retailers and develop win-win
strategies for co-existing with private labels.
With the improved information made possible by technological advances, it may
be conjectured that private labels will gain greater strength. Improved targeting of
private labels in categories and to consumers with the most promise may open up
opportunities for manufacturers to extract greater profits in product categories where
they have greatest power, while recognizing that the battle is difficult and becoming
more so in other categories.
4 Pass-through of trade promotions
In the US consumer packaged goods (CPG) industry alone, companies spend more
than $75 billion on trade promotions annually (Drèze and Bell 2003), approximately
60% of their total marketing budget (Trade Promotion 2005). Pass-through is a key
measure of trade-spending effectiveness. The American Marketing Association
defines pass-through as “The number or percentage of sales promotion incentives
offered to wholesalers or retailers by manufacturers that are extended to consumers
by those channel members.” The last 5 years have seen substantial empirical
research on the magnitude and drivers of pass-through. Besanko, Dubé, and Gupta
(2005, hereafter, BDG) investigate own and cross-brand pass-through while Pauwels
(2007) investigates the dynamics of these phenomena. Meza and Sudhir (2006)
focus on pass-through timing and Ailawadi and Harlam (2009, hereafter, AH) and
Nijs et al. (2009, hereafter NM) quantify the magnitude of pass-through and explain
variation across manufacturers (AH) and across wholesalers and retailers (NM).
In all but one of these studies, pass-through is defined as the ratio of a change in
price to a change in the cost of goods, i.e. dp/dc (Tyagi 1999), and estimated from a
regression on time series data. This measure works well for off-invoice or scan/bill-
back discounts that apply to specific items and weeks. In contrast, AH compute pass-
through as the ratio of total retail promotion spending to total trade promotion
funding provided by the manufacturer. This measure accounts not just for off-invoice
and scan/bill-back discounts but also for lump sum payments and other forms of
trade promotion funds that are not tied to individual items and/or weeks (McAlister
2007). It also separates regular from promotional price pass-through, an important
distinction as shown by McAlister (2007) and Dubé and Gupta (2008).
Estimates of mean retailer pass-through rates using times-series data vary between
0.69 (NM) and 0.83 (BDG). Median calculated pass-through is 0.75 (AH) for
manufacturers providing at least some trade funding. Thus, across a variety of data
sources and measures, the empirical generalization that average retailer pass-through
is less than 100% holds. Wholesaler pass-through rates to retailers average 1.06,
suggesting wholesalers require a demand increase to break-even on trade deals
offered by manufacturers (NM).
However, average pass-through estimates are of limited value for manufacturers
evaluating their trade-promotion programs because of the high variation around the
Market Lettaverage. NM report a standard deviation of 0.40 and AH report even greater
variation across manufacturers, with 0 pass-through in 34% of the cases and pass-
through greater than 250% in approximately 14% of the cases. Channel power can
partially explain these variations: (1) large manufacturers get more pass-through
from retailers (AH); (2) large retailers get more pass-through from wholesalers
(NM); and (3) high market share products get more retailer pass-through (BDG, AH,
NM, Pauwels 2007). Further, contrary to conventional wisdom, AH report that
retailers promote as many as 15% of manufacturers’ products without any direct
manufacturer funding. They find that this is more likely for large share manufacturers
in profitable and promotion-sensitive categories but more research is needed to
understand retailer motivations to promote products.
NM show that manufacturers and wholesalers can avoid offering unprofitable
trade deals by utilizing estimates of pass-through, price elasticity, and margins.
Relative to a scenario where each retailer receives the same 10% off invoice cost cut,
selective use of trade promotions could lead to a 56% reduction in the number of
deals, an 86% improvement in deal profitability, and a 40% reduction in promotional
costs. Future work should focus on establishing normative guidelines for trade
spending and pass-through by both wholesalers and retailers.
Also, empirical work has focused on pass-through in the form of price promotions
but non-price support in the form of displays, preferential shelf space, and other in-
store merchandising is also important to manufacturers. While NM provide empirical
evidence that the costs of channel flows and the level of feature and display support
provided by the retailer influences pass-through more work is needed to understand
how retailers make these decisions.
Meza and Sudhir (2006) document differences in pass-through over time. Since
demand elasticities vary over time for seasonal products, dp/dc may reflect not only
pass-through but also variation in demand elasticities. Using a structural approach,
they estimate dynamic patterns in pass-through while controlling for changes in
demand elasticities over time. In two categories, they find high-share items get very
high pass-through, but the rest get virtually no pass-through during regular periods. In
contrast, all items get roughly equal but smaller pass-through in high demand periods.
In essence, pass-through is deep but narrow in regular periods and broad but shallow
in high-demand periods.
More research is warranted on the timing and depth versus frequency of
promotion pass-through. As technological advances facilitate the rapid imple-
mentation of changes in pricing and merchandising and improved data make it
easier to monitor these changes through RFID, both the magnitude and timing of
pass-through will become more transparent. Will this improve the effectiveness
of trade promotions? Will it change the timing of pass-through such that money
“in the door” goes more quickly “out the door”? Future research should address
these questions.
Finally, the notion of cross-brand pass-through has generated some controversy in
the literature. BDG report cases of both positive and negative cross-brand pass-
through. McAlister (2007) refutes the existence of these effects and shows that their
statistical significance in BDG’s analysis is attributable at least partly to inadvertent
overstatement of sample size due to regional pricing patterns. In a rejoinder, Dubé
and Gupta (2008) recognize that the number of cases of significant cross-brand pass-
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improved when they allow for cross-brand pass-through effects and by using
Bayesian methods. In their aggregate analysis, AH find evidence of substantial
subsidization of promotions across categories and departments and from national
brands to private label. They do not, however, find evidence of cross-brand pass-
through across manufacturers within a category. Future research should consider in
what forms, if at all, cross-brand pass-through occurs? What are its drivers? How do
allocation rules for trade funds and accounting metrics influence estimates of these
effects (NM, McAlister 2007)?
5 The understudied leverage of advertising, assortment, and loyalty programs
5.1 Advertising
The literature on manufacturer/retailer interactions reviewed earlier mainly
studies pricing interactions. Multi-stage games with multiple strategic interactions
(e.g., wholesale price and advertising) are difficult relative to simpler games
(e.g., wholesale price alone). A more holistic picture of channel interactions
would likely include the effects and determinants of advertising, product quality,
and retail distribution. Of these factors, advertising is a natural choice to study
first. Firms can adjust their advertising expenditures relatively easily, advertising
varies substantially over time and space, and data on advertising expenditures are
readily available and might well be correlated with pass-through and other
aforementioned decisions.
The literature generally finds that advertising is relatively ineffective. Assmus
et al. (1984) meta-analysis reports an average advertising elasticity of 0.15. Lodish
et al. (1995) summarize a large number of field experiments across product
categories, finding that the advertising elasticity is about 0.26 for new brands and
0.05 for established brands. Sethuraman and Tellis (1991) find, in their meta-
analysis that price elasticity is about 20 times larger than advertising elasticity.
This suggests that firms are over-advertising, since the elasticity ratio should be
one at a profit maximizing combination of price and advertising (Dorfman and
Steiner 1954).
The question arises, if advertising is so ineffective, why do firms do so much of it?
Several potential explanations exist, but prominent among them isthe potentialeffect of
advertising on retailers.Ifadvertising affects consumerdemand, and retailers respond to
changes in consumer demand, then advertising must affect retailers’ actions. The
fundamental idea that advertising pull increases channel push proposed by Farris and
Reibstein (1984) and Olver and Farris (1989) is well known. There is also some work
on the effect of advertising on manufacturer versus retailer prices and margins (e.g.,
Steiner 1973; Kaul and Wittink 1995). Yet very few papers on advertising
effectiveness or channel interaction allow for or estimate such strategic interactions.
Measuring the effect of advertising on sales without modeling the dependence of price
and retail distribution on advertising, potentially under-estimates the full impact of
advertising. Future research should develop a more holistic modeling framework that
includes these intermediate effects of advertising on channel decisions.
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Information gathered through loyalty programs (LPs) is playing an increasingly
important role in retailers’ decisions. The LP infrastructure not only provides
detailed consumer insights, but also allows retailers to deliver a variety of targeted
marketing activities to selected households via customized direct mail/e-mail, check-
out coupons, or customized communications on the web (Zhang and Wedel 2009).
These programs are reshaping the way manufacturers and retailers interact with each
other. For example, the leading online grocer Peapod Inc. offered special promotion
services to consumer product manufacturers through its Peapod Interactive division
which implemented and monitored various customized promotions for each
manufacturer sponsor (Holleran 1997). Drug store chain CVS routinely partners
with manufacturers to deliver targeted promotions through its LP. The manufacturers
pay a membership fee and provide monetary support for those promotions. In
exchange, they receive detailed reports about the performance of their products with
different segments of CVS customers, and can target selected households and take
advantage of cross-selling opportunities.
There has been extensive research on the effect (or lack thereof) of LPs on
consumer purchase behavior, customer retention, customer lifetime value, and the
firm’s sales/financial outcomes (e.g., Bolton et al. 2000; Lal and Bell 2003; Leenheer
et al. 2007; Lewis 2004; Sharp and Sharp 1997; Taylor and Neslin 2005), but little is
known about how LPs are changing the power balance between manufacturers and
retailers. Collaboration through LPs can provide benefits for both parties (e.g.,
Pancras and Sudhir 2007). Manufacturers can achieve higher return on their trade
promotion spending due to the enhanced targeting capability and be shielded from
competitive reactions because customized promotions through LPs are not easily
observed by competitors (Zhang and Wedel 2009). Retailers can piggy back on
manufacturers’ financial support to increase their store loyalty, shopping basket size,
and customer retention. The fact that marketing offerings targeted through LPs are
not easily observed by competitors can also relieve manufacturers and/or retailers
from prisoner’s dilemmas that may arise in perfectly competitive markets where a
firm’s action is (assumed to be) known to all competitors (see Chen et al. 2001;
Shaffer and Zhang 1995).
While collaboration through LP is likely to increase the size of the pie, it is less
certain how the division of the pie may be changed. Which party will gain power—
retailers who own information or manufacturers who have financial resources? Many
other important questions also remain. For example, what is the net gain for the
retailer vs. manufacturer to collaborate in an LP? How does it change a retailer’s
bargaining power for other products not covered by the LP? How does it affect a
retailer’s private label performance? What types of LP designs are more conducive
to creating win-win opportunities? With the increasing prevalence of retail loyalty
programs, academic research needs to catch up in answering these pressing
questions.
With the technological advances we are seeing in industry, some new questions
also arise: what role will/should manufacturers and retailers play in each other’s
loyalty programs? What is the impact of loyalty in one channel (say offline) on
loyalty in an online channel? How will improved measurement of loyalty and its
Market Letttransparency affect the interaction between manufacturers and retailers? Large scale
customer relationship programs (e.g., HomeMadeSimple.com by Procter & Gamble)
that provide data on tens of millions of customers to CPG manufacturers may also
alter the relative push-pull power structure between manufacturers and competing
retailers.
5.3 Product assortment
In contrast with the vast amount of research on consumer response to product
assortment (see Broniarczyk 2008 for a recent overview), there is scant research on
how manufacturers and retailers interact to determine the composition of the
assortment. With the proliferation of SKUs and product categories, retailers have
found it difficult to directly manage every category and often outsource category
management to a leading manufacturer, referred to as the category captain (Kurtuluş
and Toktay 2004). The retailer shares information on sales, pricing, shelf space data,
etc. with the captain. The captain designs a strategic plan for the category,
encompassing recommendations on which products to include and how to allocate
space among them. In this set-up, the retailer benefits from the knowledge and
resources available to the category captain.
However, the objectives of both parties are not perfectly aligned. The captain may
gain substantial power if its recommendations (1) increase the captain’s presence on
the shelf and (2) soften competition from rival manufacturers and the retailer’s
private label. Hence, blind trust could hurt the retailer’s private label development,
profit margins, and long-term profitability. To contain these potential adverse effects,
retailers critically study the category plans provided by the captain and/or ask a rival
manufacturer to draw up an alternative plan. Therefore, manufacturers walk a fine
line between fulfilling their own objectives and those of the retailer.
With the recent advent of commercial software solutions for assortment planning,
retailers are taking back control over the management of product categories (Gartner
2007; Mantrala et al. 2009). Consequently, retailers increasingly demand new
products to add value over and above the existing assortment. In addition, they ask
for consumer-driven innovations that provide value at the store level. New products
cannot be expected to do well in every store region. Their success will depend on
store characteristics, socio-demographics of the store region, and the nature of local
competition within the category. As a result, leading manufacturers such as Unilever
and P&G invest heavily in marketing intelligence to assist retailers with knowledge
of their consumers and product categories.
Category captainship in assortment decisions raises a lot of interesting questions.
First, what criteria do the captain and retailer use when assessing the attractiveness
of a specific category configuration? Potential objectives include (growth of)
profitability, sales, and market share. The answer will likely depend on the role of
the category (Dhar et al. 2001). Second, how do captains balance their own and the
retailer’s objectives? In their study on assortment optimization in a grocery retail
setting, Rooderkerk et al. (2008) assume a weighted objective function which
balances the expected category profit of the retailer and the captain. The weight
parameter is interpreted as an indicator of the relative power of the captain compared
to the retailer.
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with product assortments? In new product categories, this may be possible by
growing the total pie. In mature categories, the only possible way may be at the
expense of other manufacturers. However, win-win situations in the short run could
increase the dependence of the retailer on the category captain in the long run.
Fourth, how does the retailer’s desire to grow private label come into play? The
retailer may wish to balance the category profit in the short run and the growth of
the private label in the long run (Meza and Sudhir 2008). Fifth, what are the
consequences for the consumer? Would a powerful category captain soften
competition leading to reduced variety and higher prices? Finally, in response to
the current trend of retailers taking back control over their assortment, future
research could focus on what additional data manufacturers should gather to improve
the quality of joint decision making. Consequently, an interesting challenge will be
to determine how these different data sources can be combined to increase
profitability of all channel partners.
6 Conclusion
This article has summarized the major insights revealed by empirical research on
manufacturer-retailer interaction and identified areas where existing findings diverge
andareinneedofresolutionorexternalvalidation.Ithasalsohighlightedmajorchanges
in the retail environment that may not only change the answers we think we already
have, but that have opened up a whole host of new questions and a new realm of
possibilitiesforcapturingandusingrichdatatoanswerthosequestions.Thereareplenty
of opportunities for studying new product categories, new markets, and new research
questions,andforlearningfromthe naturalexperimentsthatare occurringall aroundus.
But they are most likely to bear fruit if practitioners and academic researchers
collaborate to share data, ideas, and research methods. We hope the empirical insights
and ideas summarized in this article will stimulate such collaboration.
References
Ailawadi, K., & Harlam, B. (2004). An empirical analysis of the determinants of retail margins: the role of
store brand share. Journal of Marketing, 68(1), 147–166.
Ailawadi, K., & Harlam, B. (2009). Retailer promotion pass-through: a measure, its magnitude, and its
determinants. Marketing Science, 28(4), 782–791.
Ailawadi, K., Borin, N., & Farris, P. (1995). Market power and performance: a cross-industry analysis of
manufacturers and retailers. Journal of Retailing, 71(3), 211–248.
Ailawadi, K., Neslin, S., & Gedenk, K. (2001). Pursuing the value conscious consumer: store brands
versus national brand promotions. Journal of Marketing, 65(1), 71–89.
Ailawadi, K., Pauwels, K., & Steenkamp, J.-B. E. M. (2008). Private label use and store loyalty. Journal
of Marketing, 72(6), 19–30.
Assmus, G., Farley, J. U., & Lehmann, D. R. (1984). How advertising affects sales: meta-analysis of
econometric results. Journal of Marketing Research, 21(1), 25–64.
Besanko, D., Dubé, J.-P., & Gupta, S. (2003). Competitive price discrimination strategies in a vertical
channel using aggregate retail data. Management Science, 49(9), 1121–1137.
Besanko, D., Dubé, J.-P., & Gupta, S. (2005). Own-brand and cross-brand retail pass-through. Marketing
Science, 24(1), 123–137.
Market LettBolton, R., Kannan, P. K., & Bramlett, M. D. (2000). Implications of loyalty program membership and
service experiences for customer retention and value. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,
28(1), 95–108.
Broniarczyk, S. (2008). Product assortment and consumer psychology. In: Handbook of Consumer Psychology.
C. P. Haugtvedt, P. M. Herr, & F. R. Kardes (eds.), Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Camerer, C., & Ho, T.-H. (1999). Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games.
Econometrica, 67(4), 827–874.
Che, H., Sudhir, K., & Seetharaman, P. B. (2007). Bounded rationality in pricing under state-dependent
demand: do firms look ahead? How far ahead? Journal of Marketing Research, 44(3), 434–449.
Chen, Y., Narasimhan, C., & John Zhang, Z. (2001). Individual marketing with imperfect targetability.
Marketing Science, 20(1), 23–41.
Chu, J., Chintagunta, P., & Vilcassim, N. (2007). Assessing the economic value of distribution channels:
an application to the personal computer industry. Journal of Marketing Research, 44(1), 29–41.
Corstjens, M., & Lal, R. (2000). Building store loyalty through store brands. Journal of Marketing
Research, 37(3), 281–292.
Dhar, S. K., Hoch, S. J., & Kumar, N. (2001). Effective category management depends on the role of the
category. Journal of Retailing, 77(2), 165–184.
Dorfman, R., & Steiner, P. O. (1954). Optimal advertising and optimal quality. American Economic
Review, 44(5), 826–836.
Drèze, X., & Bell, D. R. (2003). Creating win-win trade promotions: theory and empirical analysis of
scan-back trade deals. Marketing Science, 22(1), 16–39.
Dubé, J.-P., & Gupta, S. (2008). Cross-brand pass-through in supermarket pricing. Marketing Science, 27
(3), 324–333.
Draganska, M., Klapper, D., & Villas-Boas, S. (2010). A larger slice or a larger pie: an empirical
investigation of bargaining power in the distribution channel. Marketing Science, 29,5 7 –74.
Erdem, T., & Keane, M. P. (1996). Decision-making under uncertainty: capturing dynamic choice
processes in turbulent consumer goods markets. Marketing Science, 15(1), 1–20.
Farris,P.W.,&Ailawadi,K.(1992).Retailpower:monsterormouse?Journal of Retailing, 68(4), 351–369.
Farris, P. W., & Reibstein, D. (1984). Overcontrol in advertising experiments. Journal of Advertising
Research, 24(3), 37–42.
Gartner (2007). Consumer goods manufacturers are losing control of space management. Gartner Industry
Research Report, ID G00154105, 1–4.
Geyskens, I., Gielens, K., & E.M. Gijsbrechts (2008) Proliferating private label portfolios: how
introducing economy and premium private labels influences brand choice. Working Paper, CentER,
Tilburg University, The Netherlands.
Goldfarb, A., Lu, Q., & Moorthy, S. (2009). Measuring brand value in an equilibrium framework.
Marketing Science, 28,6 9 –86.
Hansen, K., & Singh, V. (2008). Are store brand buyers store loyal? An empirical investigation.
Management Science, 54(10), 1828–1834.
Hartmann, W. R., & Nair, H. (2007) Retail competition and the dynamics of consumer demand for tied
goods. Working Paper, Stanford University.
Hoch, S. J., & Banerji, S. (1993). When do private labels succeed? Sloan Management Review, 34(4), 57–67.
Holleran, J. (1997). Partnering with peapod. Beverage Industry, 88(10), 38–41.
Hui, S. K., Fader, P. S., & Bradlow, E. T. (2009a). Path data in marketing: an integrative framework and
prospectus for model-building. Marketing Science, 28(2), 320–335.
Hui, S. K., Fader, P. S., & Bradlow, E. T. (2009b). The traveling salesman goes shopping: the systematic
inefficiencies of grocery paths. Marketing Science, 28(3), 566–572.
Israelevich, G. (2004). Assessing supermarket product-line decisions: the impact of slotting fees.
Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 2(2), 141–167.
Iyer, G., & Villas-Boas, M. (2003). A bargaining theory of distribution channels. Journal of Marketing
Research, 40(1), 80–100.
Kadiyali, V., Vilcassim, N., & Chintagunta, P. K. (2000). Power in manufacturer-retailer interactions: an
empirical investigation of pricing in a local market. Marketing Science, 19(2), 127–148.
Kaul, A., & Wittink, D. R. (1995). Empirical generalizations about the impact of advertising on price
sensitivity and price. Marketing Science, 14(3), 151–160.
Kurtuluş, M., & Toktay, L. B. (2004). Category captainship: who wins, who loses? ECR Journal, 4(2),
27–33.
Lal, R., & Bell, D. (2003). The impact of frequent shopper programs in grocery retailing. Quantitative
Marketing and Economics, 1(2), 179–202.
Market LettLarson, J. S., Bradlow, E. T., & Fader, P. (2005). An exploratory look at in-store supermarket shopping
paths. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 22(4), 395–414.
Leenheer, J., van Heerde, H. J., Bijmolt, T. H. A., & Smidts, A. (2007). Do loyalty programs really
enhance behavioral loyalty? An empirical analysis accounting for self-selecting members.
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 24(1), 31–47.
Lewis, M. V. (2004). The influence of loyalty programs and short-term promotions on customer retention.
Journal of Marketing Research, 41(3), 281–292.
Lodish, L. M., Abraham, M., Kalmenson, S., Livelsberger, J., Lubetkin, B., Richardson, B., et al. (1995).
How TVadvertising works: a meta-analysis of 389 real world split cable TVadvertising experiments.
Journal of Marketing Research, 32(2), 125–139.
Mantrala, M. K., Levy, M., Kahn, B. E., Fox, E. J., Gaidarev, P., Dankworth, B., et al. (2009). Why is
assortment planning so difficult for retailers? A framework and research agenda. Journal of Retailing,
85(1), 71–83.
McAlister, L. (2007). Cross-brand pass-through: fact or artifact? Marketing Science, 26(6), 876–898.
Meza, S., & Sudhir, K. (2006). Pass-through timing. Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 4(3), 351–
382.
Meza, S., & Sudhir, K. (2008). Do private labels increase retailer bargaining power? Working Paper,
University of Toronto.
Nijs, V., Misra K., Anderson, E., Hansen, K., & Krishnamurthi, L. (2009). Channel pass-through of trade
promotions. Marketing Science (in press).
Olver, J. M., & Farris, P. W. (1989). Push and pull: a one-two punch for packaged products. Sloan
Management Review, 31(1), 53–61.
Pancras, J., & Sudhir, K. (2007). Optimal marketing strategies for a customer data intermediary. Journal of
Marketing Research, 44(4), 560–578.
Pauwels, K. (2007). How retailer and competitor decisions drive the long-term effectiveness of
manufacturer promotions for fast moving consumer goods. Journal of Retailing, 83(3), 297–308.
Pauwels, K., & Srinivasan, S. (2004). Who benefits from store brand entry? Marketing Science, 23(3),
364–390.
Rooderkerk, R. P., van Heerde, H. J., & Bijmolt, T. H. A. (2008). Collaborative retailer-manufacturer
assortment optimization: an attribute-based approach. Working Paper, CentER, Tilburg University,
The Netherlands.
Sethuraman, R., & Tellis, G. J. (1991). An analysis of the tradeoff between advertising and pricing.
Journal of Marketing Research, 31(2), 160–174.
Shaffer, G., & Zhang, Z. J. (1995). Competitive coupon targeting. Marketing Science, 14(4), 395–416.
Sharp, B., & Sharp, A. (1997). Loyalty programs and their impact on repeat-purchase loyalty patterns.
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 14(5), 473–486.
Steiner, R. L. (1973). Does advertising lower consumer prices? Journal of Marketing, 37(4), 19–26.
Sudhir, K. (2001). Structural analysis of competitive pricing in the presence of a strategic retailer.
Marketing Science, 20(3), 244–264.
Sudhir, K., & Talukdar, D. (2004). Does store brand patronage improve store patronage? Review of
Industrial Organization, 24(2), 143–160.
Taylor, G. A., & Neslin, S. A. (2005). The current and future sales impact of a retail frequency reward
program. Journal of Retailing, 81(4), 293–305.
Trade Promotion (2005). Spending and merchandising study. Wilson, CT: Cannondale Associates.
Tyagi, R. K. (1999). A characterization of retailer response to manufacturer trade deals. Journal of
Marketing Research, 36(4), 510–516.
Villas-Boas, S. B. (2007). Using retail scanner data for upstream merger analysis. Journal of Competition
Law and Economics, 3(4), 689–715.
Villas-Boas, M. J., & Zhao, Y. (2005). Retailer, manufacturers, and individual consumers: modeling the
supply side in the ketchup marketplace. Journal of Marketing Research, 42(1), 83–95.
Zhang, J., & Wedel, M. (2009). The effectiveness of customized promotions in online and offline stores.
Journal of Marketing Research, 46(2), 190–206.
Market Lett